UNCTAD Transfer of Technology Code Negotiations: West and East against the Third World by Feinrider, Martin
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 30 Number 4 Article 4 
10-1-1981 
UNCTAD Transfer of Technology Code Negotiations: West and 
East against the Third World 
Martin Feinrider 
Nova University Law Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Martin Feinrider, UNCTAD Transfer of Technology Code Negotiations: West and East against the Third 
World, 30 Buff. L. Rev. 753 (1981). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol30/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
UNCTAD TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY CODE




During the past decade, much international attention has fo-
cused on the Third World demand for a New International Eco-
nomic Order (NIEO).' This effort to restructure the world econ-
omy with a view towards enhancing the competitive position of the
Less Developed Countries (LDCs) has been fueled by the recent
rapid increase in the number of such countries. 2 It has gained in-
creasing importance as western international economic relations
have gone through a decade of continuing crisis causing the world
* Assistant Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center; LL.M., International Legal
Studies, New York University School of Law; Diploma, cum laude, Hague Academy of In-
ternational Law, the Netherlands; Diploma, International Institute of Human Rights, Stras-
bourg, France; J.D., M.A., B.A., State University of New York at Buffalo.
The author gratefully acknowledges the aid provided during preparation of this Article
for publication by his research assistant, Steven Friend, a second-year student at Nova Law
Center.
1. The Declaration on Establishment of a New International Economic Order was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on May 7, 1974. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI),
6th Special Session, GAOR, Supp. (No.1), U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 IN'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 715, 720, 737 (1974). The Declaration was followed rapidly by the Pro-
gramme of Action for a New International Economic Order, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3202 (1974)
and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), 29th
Sess., GAOR, U.N. Doc. A 19946 (1974), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 251 (1975).
For a recent discussion of the NIEO, see M. BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER (1979); R. PREBISCH, EL NuEvo ORDEN ECONOMICO INTERNACIONAL Y
VALORES CULTURALES (1978); Ferguson, The New International Economic Order, 1980 U.
ILL. L.F. 693; Garcia-Amador, The Proposed New International Economic Order: A New
Approach to the Law Governing Nationalization and Compensation, 12 LAw. AM. 1 (1980).
There have been more than 700 studies by U.N. specialized agencies, 600 books, and 1,600
scholarly articles focusing on the New International Economic Order. See The New Interna-
tional Economic Order: A Selective Bibliography, U.N. Doc. ST/LIB/SER.B/30.
2. The Group of 77, formed in 1968 to represent Third World interests in the United
Nations, numbered 110 in 1978 and has been gaining members since then. See Finnegan, A
Code of Conduct Regulating International Technology Transfer: Panacea or Pitfall?, 60 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 71 (1978).
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economy to suffer instability.3
The debate over the NIEO has largely been perceived as a
struggle between the LDCs and western developed capitalist (mar-
ket economy) nations. The Soviet Union and other socialist (cen-
trally planned) nations have, despite pointed rhetorical support for
the Third World, generally been on the side-lines,4 while western
nations have been the focus of continuing verbal attack. Claiming
not to be motivated by profit, socialist countries have projected an
image of being non-exploitative in their relations with developing
nations and therefore outside the parameters of the North-South
dialogue on the NIEO.5 The relative economic weakness of the so-
cialist nations, as compared to the western industrialized nations,
is another factor which has made their inclusion in the North-
South dialogue of lesser-significance to Third World negotiators."
Third World interest in the NIEO has been based on the de-
sire to correct what are perceived as structural inequities prevent-
ing expanded membership in the world of the "haves." 7 Developed
nations have been unable to ignore demands for restructuring the
3. See M. BEDJAOUI, supra note 1, at 40; The Report of the Independent Commission
on International Development Issues (under the Chairmanship of Willy Brandt), NORTH-
SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL 7-35 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Brandt Commission].
4. Ewing, UNCTAD and the Transfer of Technology, 10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 197, 201
(1976). Rejecting the division of the world's nations into North and South, Soviet President
Leonid Brezhnev stated:
In our view, the real danger lies in the attempts to divide the non-aligned coun-
tries from the socialist countries, to set the non-aligned countries against the
socialist States and deprive the developing States of their natural and
staunchest allies. We believe that the main dividing line in the world of today
does not lie between the big and small, rich and poor countries, but between the
forces of socialism, progress and peace and those of imperialism, colonialism and
reaction opposing them.
Message addressed by Brezhnev to Boumediene on the eve of the fourth Algiers conference,
quoted in M. BEDJAOUI, supra note 1, at 34 n.2.
5. See Fomin, The New International Economic Order as Viewed in the CMEA Coun-
tries, in EASTERN EUROPE AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (E. Laszlo & J.
Kurtzman eds. 1980). For an example of the Soviet effort to define itself outside of the
North-South conflict, see Bykov, Strepetova & Letenko, UNITAR Research Report No. 15:
Soviet Experience in Transfer of Technology to Industrially Less Developed Countries
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Soviet Experience]. For a view that Third World perceptions of
the socialist bloc are beginning to be more critical, see Brandt Commission, supra note 3, at
45-46.
6. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Soviet Policy and the United States Re-
sponse in the Third World 34, (a report prepared for the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs)
(March 1981) [hereinafter cited as Soviet Policy].
7. See generally M. BEDJAOUI, supra note 1.
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global economy because LDCs are important suppliers of raw
materials and, if they were able to grow in prosperity, potentially
important markets for western surplus production." It is assumed
that "rising prosperity in the poor countries expands world trade
and therefore feeds the growth of incomes in both halves of the
world."
The demand for the NIEO, based upon the so-called "right to
development,"'10 has included as one of its most central elements a
demand for restructuring mechanisms for transfer of technology to
developing nations.11 Most developing countries are aiming for
rapid economic growth and industrialization, captivated by the al-
lure of materialism.12 Modern technology is generally perceived as
the key to leap-frogging a long, slow period of incremental develop-
ment on the road to modern economic viability.I" This perception,
in turn, leads LDC planners to the conclusion that "the technologi-
cal gap between the rich and the poor countries lies at the root of




The overwhelming majority of transfers of modern technology
8. Jeffries, Regulation of Transfer of Technology: An Evaluation of the UNCTAD
Code of Conduct, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 309, 330 (1977); Note, The Group of 77 Draft and
Provisions Concerning Supplier Guarantees for the Proposed International Code of Con-
duct on Transfer of Technology, 9 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 69, 89 (1979). See Soviet Policy,
supra note 6, at 28-29.
9. Ewing, supra note 4, at 213.
10. The right to development is one of the so-called solidarity rights which form the
"third generation" of human rights. See Vasak, Pour Les Droits de l'Homme de la
Troisieme Generation: Les Droits de Solidaritg, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, SUMMARY OF LECTURES-TENTH STUDY SESSION (1979).
11. See Ewing, supra note 4, at 197; Finnegan, supra note 2, at 115, 117; Jeffries, supra
note 8, at 309; Note, supra note 8, at 69, 72, 104; Transfer of Technology: An UNCTAD
View, 6 J. WORLD TRADE L. 252 (1972) (notes based on a report by the UNCTAD Secreta-
riat) [hereinafter cited as UNCTAD View]. See also G.A. Res. 3202 (S-VI) of May 1, 1974.
12. "The infection of materialism is already deep in the Third World." Ferguson, supra
note 1, at 704.
13. See Chudson, UNITAR Research Report No. 13: The International Transfer of
Commercial Technology to Developing Countries 4 (1971); Ewing, supra note 4, at 197;
Patel, Transfer of Technology and Third UNCTAD, 7 J. WORLD TRADE L. 226, 227 (1973);
UNCTAD View, supra note 11, at 252.
The view that technology is the key to economic progress is based, in part, on the belief
that technology played a central role in the growth of the developed nations' economies.
Eighty-seven and one-half percent of the growth in U.S. per capita income between 1909
and 1949 has been attributed to "technological progress." Ewing, supra note 4, at 197 (citing
Solow, Technological Change and the Aggregate Production, 39 lEv. EcoN. & STATISTICS
(1957)).
14. Patel, supra note 13, at 227.
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today emanate from Trans National Corporations (TNCs) based in
western developed nations.15 TNCs, long perceived in the Third
World as the engines of imperialism, are, of course, not subjects of
international law. Thus, it is the home countries of the TNCs, the
developed western nations, that have become the target of interna-
tional attempts to bring technology controlled by the TNCs within
the grasp of the developing countries.
During the past ten years the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has been sponsoring an effort
to elaborate an International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of
Technology.16 In these negotiations, as in the rest of the North-
South dialogue, the socialist nations have remained on the side-
lines.17 Despite self-professed support for radical restructuring of
the global economy, ideological commitment to the fight against
imperialism, and a growing role as an exporter of modern technol-
ogy to developing countries,1 8 the Soviet Union and the other so-
cialist nations have only participated marginally in the develop-
ment of the draft Code of Conduct for the Transfer of Technology.
Nevertheless, it is possible to glean from the minimal socialist role
in the negotiations an understanding of the true socialist perspec-
15. Finnegan, supra note 2, at 71, 73; Jeffries, supra note 8, at 312. See Chudson, supra
note 13, at 3. Lowenfeld, in attempting to define technology, points out that it "is something
developed countries have.. . . [M]ost technology is in the possession of multinational enter-
prises." Lowenfeld, Understanding and Misunderstanding-Technology Transfer, Economic
Development, and Restrictive Business Practices, Proc., 71st Ann. Meeting Am. Soc'y Int'l
L. 224 (1977).
16. At the Third UNCTAD Conference, in May of 1972, a resolution was adopted call-
ing for "a study for possible bases for new international legislation regulating the transfer
from developed to developing countries of patented and non-patented technology."
UNCTAD Res. 39 (III) at para. 9, reprinted in Patel, supra note 13 at 233-39. UNCTAD
has produced, inter alia, two major studies: Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat: Major
Issues Arising from the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, U.N. Doe. TD/13/
AC.11/10/Rev. 2 (1975); and A Study by the UNCTAD Secretariat The Possibility and Fea-
sibility of an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/B/
AC.11/22 (1974). See also, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat: An International Code of
Conduct on Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.1/2/Supp.1/Rev.1. A draft
code of conduct was produced at a 1974 Pugwash Conference, U.N. Doe. TD/B/AC.11/L.12
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Pugwash Draft], and, at the request of a Group of 77 representa-
tive, was circulated by UNCTAD at a 1974 session of the UNCTAD Intergovernmental
Group on Transfer of Technology. For an excellent review of the Pugwash Draft, and its
history, see Finnegan, supra note 2.
17. See note 4 supra.
18. See Soviet Experience, supra note 5. For an estimate of the volume of Soviet ex-
ports to developing nations, see note 44 infra.
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tive on economic relations with developing countries. That will be
the goal of this Article.
The Soviet Union and other socialist countries are both tech-
nology suppliers and recipients and thus have conflicting interests.
As combatants in a long-term economic and ideological struggle
with the West they verbally support Third World positions while
adroitly managing to allow western negotiators to protect socialist
technology supplier interests on specific Code issues.
I. TECHNOLOGY
Technology, 9 both patented and unpatented, relates to prod-
uct, production process and facilities design, and management
technique.2 0 It includes franchise methodology, conventional tech-
nology, know-how, and high technology,2 and is transferred
through a variety of mechanisms. Among these transfer mecha-
nisms are "direct investment, . . . joint ventures, licensing, man-
agement contracts, turnkey projects, and the installation and ser-
vicing of purchased industrial equipment. '22 Thus, technology can
be transferred in embodied form as part of the sale of machinery
or the provision of skilled technical assistance, or in unembodied
form through licensing or other contractual relationships. 2
Though there is suprisingly little hard data available concern-
ing the transfer of technology,24 the process is clearly rooted in the
19. The author has grave doubts concerning the potential of technology as a panacea
for underdevelopment and seriously questions the long-term viability of an international
economic and social order based upon technologically enforced domination of the earth's
resources and ecosystems. This is not meant to imply, however, that developed nations
should or can deny to LDCs the benefits that accrue from technologization of society. De-
spite the author's doubts and questions, the East, West, and Third World all assume that
technology is the key to the future, and this Article is predicated upon that assumption. An
exploration of the limitations of a technologically based world order will have to await an-
other article.
20. Chudson, supra note 13, at 3.
21. Id. at 12-20.
22. Id. at 1.
23. See Egea, Multinational Corporations in the Operation and Ideology of Interna-
tional Transfer of Technology, 10 STUD. Comp. INT'L DPv. 11 (1975); Ewing, supra note 4, at
197-98.
24. While TNCs undoubtedly possess much of this data, they do not, in general, make
it available to prospective purchasers of technology or the public. This confronts a would-be
purchaser with the following dilemma: purchase data, if it is available, which will inform
him of whether he has the need to purchase the just-purchased data; or not purchase the
data and never know whether it was needed. This has been called the "fundamental para-
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infrastructure of the developed nations, where ninety-six percent
of the total worldwide research and design expenditures are
made.26 Less than two percent of expenditures on research and de-
velopment are made in developing countries 2 and, as a result,
these countries are forced to spend substantial portions of their
foreign currency reserves for the purchase of imported technology,
thus increasing balance of payment pressures on already marginal
national economies.2 7 Payments for technology are for both direct
and indirect (hidden) costs.
28
Because of developed nation dominance of technology and the
concomitant control over its transfer, developing nations remain
technology-dependent. Though transfers to LDCs generate an ex-
tremely high rate of return on investment,29 major technology flows
dox." Egea, supra note 23, at 12. See also Jeffries, supra note 8, at 333; Note, supra note 8,
at 97 n.99. "In a situation where competition is not perfect and there are elements of mo-
nopoly, technical information may be the most closely guarded aspect of modern produc-
tion." UNCTAD View, supra note 11, at 253.
25. Brandt Commission, supra note 3, at 194. See also Ewing, supra note 4, at 198;
Note, supra note 8, at 75.
26. Ewing, supra note 4, at 198; Note, supra note 8, at 75.
27. UNCTAD View, supra note 11, at 256; Note, supra note 8, at 76. Foreign exchange
costs to LDCs for technology transfers were estimated at $1.5 billion for 1968 and were
projected to reach $9 billion by the end of the 1970's. UNCTAD View, supra note 11, at
261-64; Patel, supra note 13, at 230. For six LDCs studied, total payments for technology
amounted to seven percent of combined exports. Note, supra, note 8, at 77, citing
UNCTAD, Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190 (1973). "[F]oreign exchange
costs of the transfer of technology were increasing much more rapidly than other sectors of
the economies of the developing countries. The direct costs of the transfer have, in general,
increased about two and one-half times faster than manufacturing output in the developing
countries." Patel, supra note 13, at 228.
28. See Egea, supra note 23, at 12; Jeffries, supra note 8, at 315 n.30. Among the costs
for imported technology involving foreign exchange payments are the following:
(i) the right to use patents, licenses, know-how and trademarks;
(ii) technical knowledge and know-how needed both in the pre-investment and
investment stage and in the operation stage;
(iii) over-pricing of imports of intermediate products and equipment;
(iv) profits on capitalization of know-how (acquisition of equity participation in
place of other means of payment for transfer technology); profits on these equity
holdings are therefore to be regarded as, in part, payments for the transfer of
technology;
(v) a portion of repatriated profits of the wholly-owned subsidiaries or joint ven-
tures which do not make specific provision for payments for the transfer of
technology;
(vi) imports of capital and other technical equipment, the price of which usually
allows for the exporter's valuation of the cost of technology.
UNCTAD View, supra note 11, at 257.
29. E.g., the rate of return for U.S. direct investment in Third World countries is
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remain among developed nations. Developing nations are involved
in only ten percent of all technology transfers"0 and continue to be
denied access to the technology they desire.
TNCs, approximately ninety percent of which are U.S.
based,31 are protected by developed nations' laws3 2 and are little
concerned with the need for development of Third World na-
tions.3 3 Their motivation is for short-term profit and long-term se-
curity.3 4 When LDCs negotiate technology transfers with TNCs
they are faced with the overwhelmingly superior strength of TNCs;
TNCs play the technology transfer game with nearly all of the
cards in their hands. In general, they understand both technology
and the negotiating process far better than their Third World
counterparts. It is this unequal bargaining relationship that is at
the heart of technology transfer inequities and that the Code of
Conduct seeks to redress.
II. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
For much of this century, especially since the Bretton Woods
Agreement that followed the end of World War H, the interna-
tional economy has been purportedly based on the theoretical
model of comparative advantage.3 According to this theory, the
international division of labor should be structured so each nation
makes that which, when compared to other nations, makes best
and cheapest, with each product produced where there is a relative
economic advantage to it being produced. Further, the theory sug-
gests, a free trade model, 6 as more or less embodied in the General
double that of investment in developed countries. Note, supra note 8, at 75.
30. See UNCTAD, Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on a Code of
Conduct on Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TDIB/C.6/1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Ex-
perts' Report No. 1]; Jeffries, supra note 8, at 340; Note, supra note 8, at 75.
31. Comment, The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 and Foreign-Based Subsidiar-
ies of American Multinational Corporations: A Time to Abstain from Restraining, 11 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 206, 209 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Trading with the Enemy].
32. See Jeffries, supra note 8, at 325.
33. See the materials cited in note 34 infra.
34. See Egea, supra note 23, at 11, 28; Finnegan, supra note 2; Jeffries, supra note 8, at
310, 314, 335; Matsui, The Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries: Some Propos-
als to Solve Current Problems, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 612 (1977).
35. See generally A. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1979)
[hereinafter cited as LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS].
36. Id. at 5.
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,3 7 will most effectively accomplish
these ends. Critics respond that present structures of trade simply
institutionalize the position of advantage gained by western devel-
oped nations during the era of imperialism and exploitation that is
only now beginning to come to an end. 8 This difference of analysis
provides a useful framework within which the technology transfer
negotiations can be understood.
Western developed nations argue that unless they and their
TNCs have an incentive to continue doing what they do best, de-
veloping and selling technology, the entire international economy
will suffer from the gross inefficiency that results from deviation
from the comparative advantage model. The Third World argues
that the present division of labor does not take advantage of the
potential future comparative advantages that could be developed if
the international economy were restructured so that comparative
disadvantages produced by the present system of exploitation were
remedied. In the end, the dispute is based upon whether one uses
present comparative advantages or potential future comparative
advantages to guide Code negotiations.
The question underlying the Code negotiations is: can the pre-
sent imbalance in the power relationship between developed and
developing countries be sufficiently remedied so that developing
countries will be able to develop to their full potential thereby
benefitting themselves and the entire world economy? Using an in-
ternational version of trickle-down theory, the western nations
would state the underlying issue as follows: can the present net-
work of comparative advantages be used to their maximum benefit
to enrich the entire world economy, thus benefitting the developing
nations? One is forced to wonder, especially after studying the his-
tory of the Code negotiations, whether the true position of devel-
oped nations is to defend and perhaps even extend current advan-
tages to continue benefitting themselves to the maximum extent
possible. The West seems to negotiate out of self-interest, not for
mutual interest.
37. 61 Stat. (5) & (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. For a listing of the eight
protocols modifying the GATT, see LOWENFFLD, PUBLIC Co RmoLs, supra note 35, at 28.
38. See, e.g., M. BEDJAOUI, supra note 1, at 23, 24.
[Vol. 30760
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III. THE SOVIET UNION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Though the UNCTAD-sponsored negotiation of an Interna-
tional Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology has received
a great deal of attention in the academic literature, 9 the role of
the Soviet Union and other socialist nations in these negotiations
has barely been mentioned by commentators.40 Little is known, or
at least little is reflected in western literature, concerning the de-
tails of the extent of or mechanisms for socialist transfer of tech-
nology to developing nations.4 1 A study commissioned by the
United Nations Institute for Training and Research and carried
out by three leading Soviet academics, 2 does offer some insight,
however, into the Soviet view of its own practice in this area.
39. See, e.g., Byrne, Transfers of Technology to Developing Nations, NEw L.J., March
29, 1979; Coonrod, The United Nations Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations,
18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 273, 293 (1977); Davidow & Chiles, The United States and the Issue of
the Binding or Voluntary Nature of International Codes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive
Business Practices, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 249 (1978); Dessemontet, Transfer of Technology
Under UNCTAD and EEC Draft Codifications: A European View of Choice of Law Licens-
ing, 12 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1 (1977); Egea, supra note 23; Ewing, supra note 4; Finnegan,
supra note 2; Goekjian, Legal Problems of Transferring Technology to the Third World, 25
AM. J. COMP. L. 565 (1977); Jeffries, supra note 8; Matsui, supra note 34; Patel, supra note
13; Roffe, UNCTAD: Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology: A Progress Review, 12 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 351 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Progress Review]; Zuijdwijk, The
UNCTAD Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, 24 McGmL L.J. 562 (1978);
Note, supra note 8; Note, United Nations: International Regulation of Transnational Cor-
porations, 13 J. WORLD TRADE L. 55 (1979) [hereinafter cited as International Regulations];
Proc., Am. Soc'y Int'l L., 71st Ann. Meeting, 224 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ASIL Proceed-
ings]; UNCTAD View, supra note 11.
40. Though the absence of treatment of a subject in the literature is difficult to illus-
trate, suffice it to say that, with one exception, the role of the socialist nations in the Trans-
fer of Technology Code negotiations has rarely been given more than mention in a footnote,
or at most in a sentence or a brief paragraph in the literature on the negotiations. See the
material cited in note 39 supra. The one exception is the 1978 progress report by Pedro
Roffe, a staff member of the UNCTAD Transfer of Technology Division, writing in his per-
sonal capacity. See Progress Review, supra note 39. Writing shortly after the belated pres-
entation of the first socialist Draft Code, see note 76 infra, Roffe uncritically presents a
useful synopsis of the socialist position.
41. While there has been some treatment of Soviet trade practices, especially since the
resumption of trade with the West, see text & accompanying notes 60-63 infra, there has
not, in general, been specific treatment of the details of technology transfer to developing
nations. See, e.g., A. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR PoLmC L ENDS 148-257 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS] and the materials cited therein.
42. Soviet Experience, supra note 5. The authors are Doctor of Economics A.N. Bykov,
of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System of the Academy of Science of
the U.S.S.R., Doctor of Economics M.P. Strepetova, and Research Scholar of the Institute
A.V. Letenko.
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It is generally agreed that among socialist nations the Soviet
Union is the dominant force in technology transfers. 43 Having only
recently emerged as an active participant in international technical
exchanges,44 the Soviets nonetheless claim to benefit from a wealth
of technology transfer experience based upon the development of
their constituent national republics "on the outskirts of Russia.'4 5
Rejecting autarchy,"4 which in the past had been part of their na-
tional ideology, the Soviets now see themselves "striving for active
participation in the international division of labour and all-around
economic cooperation with other countries on the basis of full
equality of the parties concerned, non-interference in the internal
affairs of other states, respect for national sovereignty and national
interests and mutual advantage.
'47
International transfer of technology practice by the Soviet
Union reflects the state planning and monopoly of foreign trade
characteristic of socialist (centrally-planned) economies.4 8  Al-
43. "Thanks to scientific and technical cooperation socialist countries have acquired an
opportunity to use, on exceptionally favourable terms, a wealth of scientific and technical
experience accumulated by the socialist commonwealth, the Soviet Union above all." Soviet
Experience, supra note 5, at 62. In general, the Soviets transfer technology to other socialist
nations without charge under intergovernmental agreements with the members of the Coun-
cil for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON). The Soviets, however, have "concluded addi-
tional agreements providing for the transfer of technical documents ... on the basis of
certain reimbursement ... [with] a number of more advanced socialist countries (Hungary,
the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia)." Id. at 63. For a resume of the
"Transfer of Soviet Technology to Socialist Countries," see id. at 75-104.
44. Congressional Research Service, Soviet Scientific and Technical Cooperation with
Countries other than the United States (a report prepared for the Subcomm. on Science,
Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science and Technology) 1 (Feb. 1979)
[hereinafter cited as Soviet S & T]. The Soviets see the 1950's and 60's as the time when
they grew to active participation in international technical exchanges. Soviet Experience,
supra note 5, at 9. By 1970, however, the total volume of Soviet exports to LDCs amounted
to more than 2 billion dollars (computation based on data provided in Soviet Experience,
supra note 5, at 104-05, and the currency conversion rate of 1.1 rubles to the dollar, [1970]
WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 559 (Long ed. 1970)).
45. Soviet Experience, supra note 5, at 8-9. For a treatment of "Scientific and Techni-
cal Development of Soviet National Republics Economically Backward in the Past," includ-
ing the transfer of technology thereto, see id. at 13-23. The curious term "on the outskirts of
Russia" is found with some frequency in this Soviet-authored UNITAR report. See, e.g., id.
at 13, 17, 19.
46. Soviet Experience, supra note 5, at 24. For a review of changing Soviet attitudes
concerning the principle of autarchy, see LowENELD, TRADE CONTROLS, supra note 41, at
148-60.
47. Soviet Experience, supra note 5, at 24.
48. See LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS, supra note 41, at 151-63.
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though supervision of foreign economic relations is entrusted to
several state bodies,49 direct contacts with foreign enterprises are
accomplished through state-run foreign trade organizations, 0
which are all-union corporations that conduct business on their
own behalf.5 1 Technology is, of course, state-owned, 52 and its trans-
fer to socialist and non-socialist states occurs according to different
rules.53
The Soviets transfer technology through a variety of mecha-
nisms, 4 the most important of which is the intergovernmental
agreement on economic and technical cooperation.55 Although will-
ing to transfer technology on normal commercial terms with pri-
vate enterprises,5" the Soviets prefer to conclude contracts,
49. The state bodies with responsibility for supervision of international economic rela-
tions are: the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, Ministry for Foreign Trade, Ministry for For-
eign Affairs, the State Committee for Science and Technology, and the State Committee for
Foreign Economic Relations of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers which has specific respon-
sibility for economic and technical assistance to foreign nations. See Soviet S & T, supra
note 44, at 5-7.
50. Lowenfeld reports that in 1975 there were approximately 60 foreign trade organiza-
tions in the Soviet Union. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS, supra note 41, at 157. Accord,
Soviet S & T, supra note 44, at 6. Soviet Experience, supra note 5, at 27-32, cites only
twelve as engaging in the transfer of technology through export.
51. The Soviets recognize foreign trade organizations as independent legal persons and
apparently make no claim of sovereign immunity for them though they are state owned and
controlled. See Soviet Experience, supra note 5, at 27.
52. See Soviet S & T, supra note 44, at 4.
53. Soviet Experience, supra note 5, at 60.
54. Among the ways the Soviet Union transfers technology to developing countries are
the following. "deliveries of equipment, construction of industrial and other projects, pros-
pecting, design and research work, transfer and selling of licenses and technical know-how,
help in training national personnel and development of the scientific and technical infra-
structure." Soviet Experience, supra note 5, at 25. These are accomplished through inter-
governmental agreements on economic and technical assistance, special intergovernmental
agreements relating to individual projects, joint ventures, and through usual commercial
terms outside the framework of intergovernmental agreements. See id. at 38-56. The major
differences between technology transfers via intergovernmental agreements and via commer-
cial non-governmental agreements are in the mechanisms for drawing up and registering the
forms of assistance and the higher prices for commercial relationships. Id. at 56.
55. The transfer of Soviet technology to other countries is usually regulated by inter-
governmental agreements. "In 1970 the U.S.S.R. had such agreements with all socialist
countries, and also with 40 developing countries." Soviet Experience, supra note 5, at 39.
See also LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS, supra note 41, at 156-65. In 1979 the Congressional
Research Service reported that the Soviet Union had concluded 64 economic and technical
cooperation agreements with developing countries. Soviet S & T, supra note 44, at 10. For a
list of some of these countries, see id. at 91-109.
56. Technical assistance to developing countries on commercial terms has been ex-
panding and is available to state organizations or private firms "if it answers the national
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whether with private or state bodies, in conformity with "General
Conditions" established by prior intergovernmental agreement.
These "General Conditions ... determine the rights and obliga-
tions of the supplier and customer"57 with regard to a long list of
issues normally settled by westerners in the contract proper.
The Soviets perceive their role in the international transfer of
technology as clearly distinguishable from the role of western capi-
talist nations."' Claiming to be responsive to a whole host of Third
World concerns, 9 the Soviets further claim to believe that they see
"turning economically less developed countries into modern indus-
trial-agrarian states with diversified national economies and a high
level of technological development as the most important aspect of
technical assistance."60 Judged by their behavior in the Transfer of
Technology Code negotiations, it appears likely their true motiva-
tions are somewhat less altruistic.61
A picture of Soviet practice and interests in the international
interests of a developing country and is implemented on a mutually advantageous basis."
Soviet Experience, supra note 5, at 55 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 42-43. Among the issues usually settled by the "General Conditions" are the
following: collection of initial design data, delivering equipment and materials, manpower
responsibilities, customer guarantees, provision of technical documents, provision of training
specialists, guarantees of patent purity, project deadlines, reclamation procedures, etc.
Thus, in technology transfers operating under intergovernmental agreements, all that is left
for the contract is "to agree on the quantity and nomenclature of the equipment and mater-
ials to be supplied, as well as the costs [and] deadlines for deliveries . . . ." Id. at 43.
58. E.g., "[T]he principles, methods and ways of transfer of technology by the Soviet
Union to other countries substantially differ from those practiced by the capitalist coun-
tries." Id. at 8. "The experience of the transfer of Soviet technology to developing countries
convincingly shows that the Soviet Union, as a socialist state where the basic means of pro-
duction are nationalized,. . . has the decisive advantage over the capitalist countries, where
the major seats of technical progress are in the hands of the biggest companies and firms."
Id. at 185.
59. Throughout the entire UNITAR report on Soviet transfer of technology the Soviet
authors cite a large number of Third World needs, desires, and demands to which, they
repeatedly assert, Soviet transfer mechanisms are responsive. Among these are the follow-
ing: the need to take local conditions into account, free transfer of technical documents,
long-term, low-interest credit, the most modem technology, favourable terms, no licensor
control over licensee production and exportation, the use of local labor and materials, train-
ing of local personnel, treatment as sovereign equals, non-interference in internal affairs and
an absence of demands for political or economic concessions. See id.
60. Id. at 40.
61. See text & accompanying notes 101-26 infra. For one account describing effects of
Soviet technology transfer practice similar to those of TNC practice, see UNCTAD, Major
Issues Arising from the Transfer of Technology: A Case Study of Sri Lanka, U.N. Doc.
TD/B/C.6/6.
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transfer of technology would not be complete without comment on
the import side of the relationship. After a prolonged period of no
trade with the West, the Soviets, with the death of Stalin, showed
renewed interest in such trade.2 The 1960's can be characterized
as the epoch of establishing trade relations with Western Europe s
and, in the 1970's, this process was extended to the United
States." The Soviets have shown interest in both high technology
needed to modernize their industry6 5 aid in technology needed to
produce western-style consumer goods which have become attrac-
tive to the Soviet people.6 6 Whether detente was accomplished to
ease the way for trade relations, or whether trade relations were
meant to cement the political advances of the Soviet Union re-
flected in detente, is not entirely clear.6 7 Nevertheless, Soviet inter-
est in access to western technology has been strong and mainte-
nance of ready access has become a major goal of Soviet foreign
policy.
6 8
As has been typical of Soviet ideological rationalization since
the revolution of 1917, the Soviets still seem to believe that what is
good for the Soviet Union is good for the world communist revolu-
tion and the struggle against imperialism. 9 It is believed that ac-
cess to western technology will benefit the economy of the Soviet
Union thereby ensuring survival of and success for the on-going
Soviet Revolution and the world-wide revolutionary movement of
which the Soviet Union purports to be the vanguard.
62. See LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS, supra note 41, at 148; Note, An Overview of
Export Controls on Transfer of Technology to the U.S.S.R. in Light of Soviet Intervention
in Afghanistan, 5 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 555, 557-58 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Ex-
port Controls].
63. See LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS, supra note 41, at 149.
64. See generally LoWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS, supra note 41, at 149, 173-257; Note,
U.S. Technology Transfers to the Soviet Union and the Protection of National Security,
11 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1037, 1039-50 (1979) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Technology
Transfers].
65. E.g., computers, lasers, microprocessing equipment, and oil and gas drilling equip-
ment. Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1980, at 3, col. 3.
66. E.g., Pepsi Cola.
67. See LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS, supra note 41, at 160.
68. For a brief American view of the effects of western technology on the Soviet Union,
see Soviet S & T, supra note 4, at 7-8. For a review of East-West technology transfers, see
generally E. ZALESKI & H. WEiNERT, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
(1980).
69. See Soviet Policy, supra note 6, at 29-30.
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IV. THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY CODE NEGOTIATIONS
The United Nations Conference on an International Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology has held sessions in 1975,
1978, and 1980. The bulk of the work, however, has been con-
ducted at intersessional meetings of the Intergovernmental Group
of Experts.70 The negotiating process has been organized according
to the usual U.N. practice of consolidating states into relatively
like-minded negotiating units: China, Group B (western developed
nations), Group of 77 (developing nations-numbering in excess of
110), and Group D (the Soviet Union, the socialist countries of
Eastern Europe and Mongolia). 1
Based on a Pugwash draft, 2 the original Draft Code of the
Group of 77 was presented in May of 1975.7s Group B, upset by the
fact that the Group of 77 had presented a negotiating draft which
exhaustively treated all items at issue, 4 responded with its own
draft. The Group of 77 and Group B offered revised drafts in
70. See Experts' Report No. 1, supra note 30; UNCTAD, Report of the Intergovern-
mental Group of Experts on an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology
on its Second Session, U.N. Doe. TD/AC.1/7 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Experts' Report
No. 2]; UNCTAD, Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on an International
Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology on its Third Session, U.N. Doe. TD/AC.1/9
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Experts' Report No. 3]; UNCTAD, Report of the Intergovern-
mental Group of Experts on an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology
on its Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/11 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Experts' Report
No. 4]; UNCTAD, Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on an International
Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology on its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/15
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Experts' Report No. 5]; UNCTAD, Report of the Intergovern-
mental Group of Experts on an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology,
U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/18/Add.1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Experts' Report No. 6]. The In-
tergovernmental Group of Experts, in turn, functions through working groups. Progress Re-
view, supra note 39, at 352.
71. China, which has generally been supportive of the Group of 77 in the negotiating
process, is not dealt with in this Article.
72. See note 16 supra.
73. Text of the Draft Outline for the Preparation of an International Code of Conduct
on Transfer of Technology as originally submitted by the expert from Mexico on behalf of
the experts from the Group of 77, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/L.1/Rev.1, (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Group of 77 1975 Draft]. Shortly after submitting this draft, the Group of 77 offered a
revised version. See Revised Draft Outline for the Preparation of an International Code of
Conduct on Transfer of Technology submitted by the expert from Brazil on behalf of the
experts from the Group of 77, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/1 Annex III (1975), reprinted in 14
INT'L LEGAL MAmRIALS 1333 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Group of 77 1975 Revised Draft].
74. See Experts' Report No. 1, supra note 30, at 11-12 (statement of the spokesman for
the experts from developed countries, members of Group B).
75. Draft Outline for the Preparation of an International Code of Conduct on Transfer
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1977, at which time Group D finally offered its own Draft Code of
Conduct. 6 Composite negotiating texts were prepared by the
UNCTAD Secretariat in 1978, after the second session of the Con-
ference, and in 1980, after the close of the third session of the Con-
ference.7 7 These composite negotiating texts present code language
tentatively agreed upon by representatives of the four negotiating
units and parenthetically offer the various proposals with regard to
those portions of the Code remaining unsettled.
A. The Negotiating Framework
While the code negotiations aim to improve developing coun-
try access to technology and thus increase the rate of economic
growth and "eradicate poverty, illiteracy and inequality, '7 8
it is equally essential that the technology receiving countries are not over-
burdened with such unbearable costs that their external balance of payments
would become severly strained; with such restrictive conditions in transfer
agreements that their potential for exporting products would not be devel-
oped; or with such technology as is not suited to their own factor endowment
at present and to the requirements for growth over the years to come.7
Economically beneficial full access to technology, then, it is agreed,
is the Code's broad goal. Disagreements, however, have occurred
with regard to the detailed inter-related issues of restrictive busi-
of Technology submitted by the expert from Japan on behalf of the experts from Group B,
U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.1I/L.2 (1975), reprinted in 14 Iw'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1329 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Group B 1975 Draft].
76. Revised Text of Draft Outline of an International Code of Conduct on Transfer of
Technology submitted on behalf of the experts from the Group of 77, U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/
11 Annex 11 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Group of 77 1977 Draft]; Revised Outline of a Code
of Conduct Consisting of Guidelines for the International Transfer of Technology submitted
on behalf of the experts from Group B, U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/11 Annex I1 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Group B 1977 Draft]; Revised Outline of the Draft Code of Conduct for the Trans-
fer of Technology as suggested by experts from ... [Group D], U.N. Doc. TD/AC.1/11 An-
nex IV (1975) [hereinafter cited as Group D 1977 Draft]. These drafts are reprinted in,
respectively, 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERiALs 462, 473 & 481 (1978). Useful synoptic tables appear
at U.N. Doc.'TD/AC.1/11 Annex V & Annex VI (1977).
77. UNCTAD, Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology as
of 11 November 1978, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/9 (1978), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 453 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Composite 1978 Draft]; UNCTAD, Draft Inter-
national Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology as at the close of the third session
of the Conference on 6 May 1980, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/25 (1980), reprinted in 19
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 773 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Composite 1980 Draft].
78. UNCTAD View, supra note 11, at 265.
79. Patel, supra note 13, at 226.
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ness clauses 0 (including those involving "packaging" of technol-
ogy81), supplier guarantees, 2 and the applicable law for dispute
resolution.88 In the end, the most fundamental issue is the binding
or non-binding nature of the Code.'
The negotiations have taken place within the UNCTAD policy
perspective of seeking to establish an international regulatory
framework, encourage unpackaged transfers, improve access at fair
and reasonable prices, ensure effective performance of transfer ar-
rangements, and develop indigenous technological capacities.8 5 De-
spite apparent acceptance by Group B and Group D nations of
these shared UNCTAD and Group of 77 objectives, 6 the in-fight-
ing as to precisely which elements of present transfer mechanisms
need reform, and how those reforms should be effected, has been
fierce.
The negotiating position of Group B nations has been based
on a "you can't get there from here" critique of the Group of 77
plan. 7 The Group B nations, in the Code negotiations, function as
representatives of the TNCs and seem to make every effort to
maintain the status quo.8 They argue, sometimes persuasively,
80. The heart of the draft codes is the chapter on restrictive business practices, see
Finnegan, supra note 2, at 81, and "many of the objectives sought to be achieved by the
developing country enterprises are the same as, or analogous to, those at which the antitrust
laws [of developed nations] are aimed." Id. at 78. Finnegan presents an excellent review of
the issues involved in the negotiation of the restrictive business practices chapter, including
those relating to the following practices: tie-in clauses, package licensing, tie-out clauses,
price-fixing, production volume restraints, export restrictions, field of use restrictions, uni-
lateral grant-back provisions, limitations on transferee research and development, quality
control clauses, exclusive sales or representation agreements, non-currency royalty pay-
ments, licensor participation in management clauses, attempts to exact royalty payments in
the absence of valid property rights, restrictions on use after expiration of agreements, and
clauses requiring continuation of payments for unused technology. Id. at 84-103.
81. The packaging of technology requires developing nations to purchase undesired
technology along with desired technology. It often requires them to take the worst along
with the best, the expensive along with the inexpensive, and the unsuited along with the
well-adapted technology.
82. See Finnegan, supra note 2, at 103-10.
83. For a review of the issues relating to the question of applicable law, see Des-
semontet, supra note 39.
84. See text & accompanying notes 110-18 infra.
85. See Ewing, supra note 4, at 200.
86. "The spokesman for Group B said that the members of his Group shared the objec-
tives outlined by the spokesman for the Group of 77 .. "Experts' Report No. 2, supra
note 70, at 4.
87. For one articulation of this critique, see Jeffries, supra note 8, at 329.
88. Id. at 315.
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that international regulation of technology transfer will not be ef-
fective unless it allows the TNCs sufficient return on investment to
provide incentive for engaging in research and development work
and comparable incentive for then transferring the results of that
work to developing nations."" They contend that any regulation
which limits profits by infringing upon the basic property rights of
the TNCs will, in the end, be dysfunctional.90 Group of 77 nations
respond that unless the status quo is radically altered the Code
will be useless. Repeatedly citing the need to have their grievances
redressed and the New International Economic Order established,
the Group of 77 presses for its desired reforms and appears to ig-
nore the issue of incentives. The power of the Group B negotiating
position is countered by the obstinacy of the Group of 77
negotiators.
B. The Group B Negotiating Position
The Group B commitment to representation of TNC interests
and maintenance of current advantages has led to the articulation
of several politically untenable, or at least transparent, negotiating
positions. For example, Group B nations, while strongly backing a
legally binding international code of conduct on corrupt business
practices,"1 have insisted that the technology transfer code must be
of a voluntary nature because a binding code would allegedly be
unworkable.9 2 Furthermore, even within the context of their non-
binding draft, the Group B negotiators consistently insist on
"should" rather than "shall" in describing TNC obligations in the
transfer process.9 With regard to the chapter on restrictive busi-
ness practices the Group B negotiators have opposed many pro-
scriptions that are already embodied in the national legislation of
many of the group's member nations, thus appearing desirous of
allowing certain corporate conduct in developing nations which has
already been declared impermissible in developed nations.9 In re-
89. For a presentation of this argument, see Finnegan, supra note 2.
90. For an excellent example of this argument, see Matsui, supra note 34.
91. Davidow & Chiles, supra note 39 at 249 n.10.
92. See id. at 254. See also U.N. Doc. E/C.10/SR.19 (1976), at 2.
93. See text & accompanying notes 114-18 infra.
94. For a comparison of the Group B negotiating position on restrictive business clauses
and developed countries' municipal legislation on the same subject, see Finnegan, supra
note 2, at 84-103.
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sponse to the Group of 77 demand that the law applicable to dis-
putes concerning technology transfer agreements be the law of the
technology receiving nations, 95 Group B insists that the parties to
an agreement be permitted to negotiate the applicable law as part
of the agreement, 98 thus continuing to ignore the lack of bargaining
power of developing countries that led to the call for a code of con-
duct in the first place. With regard to the issue of unpackaging
transferred technology, the Group B 1975 Draft did not even ad-
dress the issue97 and the Group B 1977 Draft went only so far as to
propose that "[s]ource enterprises should. . . be responsive to in-
quiries about the unpackaging of transferred technology."9 8 This
certainly was not responsive to the modest Group of 77 proposal
prohibiting packaging arrangements that require, as a condition for
obtaining the desired technology, acceptance of additional technol-
ogy not desired by the recipient or needed in the recipient
country.9 9
95. The 1975 draft of the Group of 77 provided: "Technology transfer arrangements
shall be governed, with regard to their validity, performance and interpretation, by the laws
of the technology-receiving country. The technology-receiving country shall exercise legal
jurisdiction over the settlement of disputes pertaining to transfer of technology arrange-
ments between the parties concerned." Group of 77 1975 Draft, supra note 73, at 14.
96. In 1977 Group B offered the following language:
The parties to a technology transfer agreement should be permitted freely to
choose the law governing the validity, performance and interpretation of the
agreement, provided that the State whose law is chosen either has a substantial
relationship to the parties or to the transaction or there is other reasonable basis
for the parties' choice. The parties should also be permitted to leave the issue of
governing law for decision by the forum before which a dispute relating to a
transfer of technology is tried . . .. The parties to a technology transfer agree-
ment should be freely permitted to choose the forum before which disputes re-
lating to the agreement shall be tried, and any such choice should be given effect
unless there is no reasonable basis for the selection and the choice places an
onerous burden on one of the parties.
Group B 1977 Draft, supra note 76, at 15.
97. See Group B 1975 Draft, supra note 75.
98. Group B 1977 Draft, supra note 76, at 8 (emphasis added). The Group B proposal
continued with recognition "that there are instances where the success of a technology rests
in its application as a whole." Id.
99. In 1975 the Group of 77 proposed that "[r]equiring the acceptance of additional
technology not desired by the recipient or needed in the recipient country . . . as a condi-
tion for obtaining the technology required" shall be prohibited as a restrictive business
practice. Group of 77 1975 Draft, supra note 73, at 5-6. In 1977 the Group of 77 offered
language which would have prohibited "[d]esignating or restricting sources of technology,
goods or services, or requiring acceptance of additional technology . . . not needed or not
wanted by the acquiring party or the technology receiving country or limiting access to new
technological developments, as a condition for obtaining the technology required." Group of
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In summary, Group B negotiators can be said to have been
stonewalling with regard to the significant issues. Insisting on a
non-binding code, they go further and limit their language to a se-
ries of precatory statements that do not even begin to address seri-
ously the issues raised by developing countries. Not only have
Group B negotiators been unresponsive to Third World demands,
but, worse yet, they have continually allowed themselves to appear
unresponsive and thus have taken on the devil's mantle in the ne-
gotiating rooms.
C. Comparing the Negotiating Positions of East and West
In contrast to the overt foot-dragging of Group B negotiators,
Group D negotiators have managed to protect their technology
supplier advantages over Third World technology recipients with-
out appearing exploitative. The socialists have succeeded in having
western developed nations protect their supplier interests while
appearing in the negotiations as anti-imperialist champions of the
developing nations. They use the negotiations to press their politi-
cal line of non-discrimination in technology transfer 00 in an effort
to gain increased access to western technologyI1 and have only a
very limited number of other Code sections which they have made
into priorities.'02 Beyond this, they have allowed the negotiations
to be a battle between the West and the Third World and simply
chimed in regularly with pro-Third World rhetoric. They appear to
recognize that in a power contest between the West and the Third
World, the West will surely win. Thus, where Group B and Group
D supplier interests coincide, Group D, without suffering damage
to its international political image, gains the benefit of the Group
B defense of technology supplier interests. 03
The adroitness and political sophistication of Group D negoti-
ators can be seen through close scrutiny and analysis of their nego-
tiating positions on fundamental issues debated during the course
77 1977 Draft, supra note 76, at 8-9.
100. See text & accompanying notes 123-25 infra.
101. See text & accompanying notes 62-69 supra.
102. For examples of areas of Soviet concern, see text & accompanying notes 106-10 &
119-21 infra.
103. See, e.g., Progress Review, supra note 39, at 351, where Pedro Roffe defines the
dispute concerning the legal character of the Code as being between Group B and the Group
of 77, and compare text & accompanying notes 110-13 infra.
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of the elaboration of the Draft International Code of Conduct on
Transfer of Technology. First, however, several preliminary re-
marks are in order.
It must be remembered that socialist nations have long in-
sisted international law not be made without the participation of
all major blocs, including the socialist bloc, 104 and have regularly
participated in the elaboration of most significant international in-
struments. Nevertheless, Group D did not submit its own draft of
the Code until two years after the initial submission of the Group
B and Group of 77 drafts,105 thus permitting the issues to be
framed and agenda set without active socialist participation. This
hesitance to enter the fray is most unusual, and significant. The
socialist nations allowed the stage to be set for a confrontation be-
tween developing and western developed nations without having to
present their own views in writing and without having to delineate
a socialist position on the majority of issues being negotiated. By
allowing the other two major negotiating units to put forward
drafts first, the socialist nations were able to see which of their
interests would be adequately protected by the Group B draft
without need for any special effort on their own part. They were
also able to see precisely which of the Group of 77 proposals they
could endorse in their own belated draft without endangering their
technology supplier interests.
With regard to their role as suppliers, Group D negotiators
have been interested in ensuring "effective protection of industrial
property rights."10 Though this language seems to reflect the un-
derlying perspective of Group D, it did not appear in the Group D
draft. It was offered, however, as a socialist alternative to a section
of the Code in dispute between Group B and Group of 77 negotia-
tors.107 In offering this language Group D managed to ally itself, in
effect, with Group B without explicitly adopting Group B lan-
guage.10 8 For the most part, the technology suppliers (of Groups B
104. See Hazard, Soviet Tactics in International Lawmaking, 7 DENVER J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 9, 21-22 (1977).
105. See text & accompanying notes 73, 75-76 supra.
106. Composite 1978 Draft, supra note 77, at 10.
107. Group B also proposed to "ensure effective protection of industrial rights." Id. at
9. The Group of 77 proposed to "ensure an equitable balance between the needs of economic
and social development, particularly of the developing countries, and the rights granted by
industrial property." Id.
108. While both Group B and Group D proposed to "ensure effective protection of in-
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and D) won on this point." 9
With respect to the legal nature of the Code, which will deter-
mine the effect to be given all other provisions, Group D has con-
sistently advocated a code which would be "optional and allow for
flexibility" 11 -that is, one which is non-binding. While attempting
to have the question of the Code's legal character "set aside for the
time being," a representative of Group D indicated that "he felt
that a code consisting only of guidelines [such as proposed by
Group B] would be too weak; it should contain a set of rules."' ,
No explanation of how non-binding rules would be stronger than
non-binding guidelines was ever offered, 1 2 yet the appearance was
left of Group D being critical of western developed nations for
avoiding the promulgation of "rules." Nevertheless, Group D has
consistently supported the principle that the Code be non-
binding.
113
During the effort to elaborate the Code there have been nu-
dustrial property rights," Group B's proposal concluded with "and other rights of parties
involved in the transfer of technology," while Group D's proposal concluded with "and other
related rights." Id. at 9-10. The two proposals are the same in substance, but Group D was
able to distance itself from Group B by merely choosing different words with identical
effect.
109. The language eventually agreed upon by all negotiating parties and appearing in
the 1980 Composite Draft reads as follows: "Each country ... should ensure an effective
protection of industrial property rights granted under its national law and other related
rights recognized by its national law." Composite 1980 Draft, supra note 77, at 9 (emphasis
added).
110. Experts' Report No. 1, supra note 30, at 7 (statement of the spokesman for the
experts from countries that are members of Group D).
111. Id. at 14 (statement of the spokesman for countries that are members of Group D).
112. Presumably, the use of the term "rules" is a reflection of the Soviet jurisprudential
perspective that international law is built upon a hierarchy of norms, one level of which is
referred to as consisting of "rules." For an overview of Soviet thought on the hierarchy of
norms in international law, see generally Alexidze, Jus Cogens, COLLECTED COURSES HAGUE
ACAD. INT'L L. (for the year 1981) (forthcoming); Tunkin, International Law in the Interna-
tional System, 147 COLLECTED COURSES HAGUE AcAD. INT'L L. (1975). Tunkin, a leading
Soviet international lawyer, however, has written:
[e]ven if such a rule of conduct does appear it does not necessarily become a
judicial norm; it may merely be a norm of international ethics or a norm of in-
ternational courtesy. . . . A rule of conduct, being the result of universal prac-
tice, becomes a customary norm of international law only if it has been accepted
or recognized by the states as juridically binding as a norm of law.
Tunkin, Remarks on the Juridical Nature of Customary Norms of International Law, 49
CAL. L. REv. 419, 420, 422-23 (1961) (footnote omitted). It would thus appear that a non-
binding set of "rules" would be no stronger than a non-binding set of "guidelines."
113. See text & accompanying note 110 supra.
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merous disputes concerning choice of language between "should"
and "shall.111 4 Group B, advocating a non-binding code, has con-
sistently supported use of the word "should" to describe the obli-
gations of technology suppliers; the Group of 77, on the other
hand, advocates formulation of the Code as a binding international
treaty, and has consistently supported the word "shall" to describe
obligations to be undertaken by suppliers.115 Group D, however,
has staked out for itself a rather unusual but effective position.
While insisting on a non-binding code, Group D regularly joined
the Group of 77 in supporting utilization of "shall" to describe
suppliers' obligations.11 6 Thus, Group D has managed to maintain
its fundamental position of advocating a non-binding legal charac-
ter for the Code, but has also supported Group of 77 language in
instances where Group B has taken a principled, but essentially
useless, position of opposition.
The Group D strategy can best be understood when compared
to Group B negotiating practice concerning the choice of "should"
or "shall." There are only three conceivable reasons for the Group
B nations' insistence on use of conditional language. First, they
may expect to be unable, in the end, to prevent the Code from
being binding and therefore, to protect suppliers, need to insist on
precatory language to describe the obligations undertaken. They
would thus weaken what would otherwise be, in their view, an
unacceptably rigid treaty. It is unlikely, however, that the Code
will become binding hard law in the face of joint Group B and
Group D opposition. The socialist nations, realizing they will win
114. The should/shall dispute occurs at eight locations in the Composite 1978 Draft,
supra note 77, and eight locations in the Composite 1980 Draft, supra note 77. Among the
sections of the Code where this language is most in dispute are the chapters on restrictive
business practices and supplier guarantees. In each instance Group B supports use of
"should" and the Group of 77 and Group D support "shall." Similarly, in paragraph 11 of
the Preamble, Group B would have "all countries encourage that their enterprises, whether
public or private, follow in all respects the provisions of [the] code," while the Group of 77
and Group D would have "all countries ensure that their enterprises, whether public or
private, shall conform in all respects to the provisions of [the] Code." Composite 1980 Draft,
supra note 77, at 2 (emphasis added). The analysis presented in the text regarding "should"
and "shall" would apply equally to this preambular language.
115. Id. "[I]n law a world of difference exists between a legally binding instrument and
one the observance of which depends wholly on the good will of the States concerned."
Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary
Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23, 33 (1965). Bin Cheng goes on to warn that "[p]seudo law can
be the worst enemy of the rule of law," Id. at 48.
116. Composite 1980 Draft, supra note 77.
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the more significant battle for a non-binding legal character for the
Code, are willing to give in on the relatively insignificant choice of
grammatical mood. The use of mandatory language in a non-bind-
ing code does not discernably strengthen the obligations of the
parties. 1 7 Group B is thus left, isolated, to fritter away its political
goodwill re-fighting a war already won. Second, Group B negotia-
tors may fear that the final text of the Code will leave the legal
character ambiguous and thus they may wish to ensure recognition
of the Code as a non-binding agreement by filling it with precatory
language. But, "[g]overnments may enter into precise and definite
engagements as to future conduct with a clear understanding...
that the agreements are not legally binding."11 8 The Code's
travaux preparatoires already manifest the clear intention of
Groups B and D that the Code be non-binding and therefore the
likelihood of an ambiguous legal character is, at best, slight indeed.
Third, Group B may intend to withdraw its objection to a binding
code. No hint of such a major concession has yet been revealed by
Group B negotiators. Moreover, it would be disingenuous for
Group B to agree to a legally binding treaty filled with precatory
language, and no political gain could be expected from such ma-
neuvering. Thus, one may conclude there is little to be gained from
insistence on use of the word "should," and much to be lost by
fighting such useless battles. Group D negotiators have clearly un-
derstood this well, and have conducted themselves accordingly.
Group D has only rarely put itself in direct opposition to the
Group of 77, and has done so only when a priority interest was at
stake. Thus, in conjunction with Group B, Group D opposed inclu-
sion in the Code of language, suggested by the Group of 77,11' lim-
iting possible circumvention of the Code's provisions by way of bi-
lateral or multilateral intergovernmental agreement.1 2 0 In view of
the extreme significance of intergovernmental agreements to so-
117. See note 112 supra.
118. Editorial Comment-The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agree-
ments, 71 Am. J. INT'L L. 296, 299 (1977) (by Oscar Schachter).
119. Composite 1980 Draft (proposed para. 1.6 of the Group of 77), supra note 77, at 5
n.5.
120. The text proposed by the Group of 77 reads as follows: "Bilateral and multilateral
agreements between States on the transfer of technology for meeting socio-economic needs
of development in accordance with the chapters on objectives and principles and special
treatment, should be consistent with the Code." Id.
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cialist procedures for technology transfer," 1 opposition to this
Third World proposal was to be expected. Indeed, this is yet an-
other example of Group D expending political capital only when
absolutely necessary.
As mentioned above,122 the socialist nations need to protect
two different sets of interests: their interests as technology suppli-
ers to developing nations and their interests as potential recipients
of western technology. With regard to their role as technology re-
cipients, the socialist nations have strongly and repeatedly advo-
cated inclusion in the Code of a section prohibiting discrimination,
whether political or economic, by technology suppliers.1 23 This was
clearly an attempt to proscribe western national export controls
that have long interfered with Soviet efforts to import high-tech-
nology.1 24 The Soviet-proposed language proscribing such discrimi-
nation was, however, invariably tied with language supportive of
Third World desires that the traditional litany of developing na-
tions' rights be respected. 2 5 Thus, the major demand of the social-
121. See text & accompanying notes 54-57 supra.
122. See text & accompanying notes 62-67 supra.
123. The Group D call for inclusion in the Code of a section prohibiting political dis-
crimination appears throughout the records of the drafting sessions. See, e.g., Experts' Re-
port No. 2, supra note 70, at 4, 8; Experts' Report No. 4, supra note 70, at 7; Experts'
Report No. 5, supra note 70, at 6, 16; Experts' Report No. 6, supra note 70, at 4, 14. The
Group D Draft provided: "The transfer of technology shall be based upon observance of the
principles of equality, mutual benefit, respect for national sovereignty and the goals of eco-
nomic and social development for all States, and shall exclude the use of political, eco-
nomic and other kinds of discrimination." Group D 1977 Draft, supra note 76, at 8 (Chap-
ter IV: Exclusion of Political Discrimination and Restrictive Business Practices) (emphasis
added).
124. Note, U.S. Technology Transfers to the Soviet Union and the Protection of Na-
tional Security, supra note 64, at 1037. Sudden changes of political mood in the West, re-
cently seen after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and again after the 1981 imposi-
tion of martial law in Poland, and the resulting limitations on Soviet access to western
technology, are thought to be particularly troublesome to Soviet state planners. See Fomin,
supra note 5, at 8-9. See generally Note, An Overview of Export Controls on Transfer of
Technology to the U.S.S.R. in Light of Soviet Intervention of Afghanistan, supra note 62,
at 555. Most recently, the Reagan Administration has attempted to prevent Soviet access to
western technology needed for an oil and gas pipeline to Western Europe.
125. The Group D Draft proposes prohibiting discrimination, particularly in the form
of:
(i) restrictions adopted on account of different economic and social systems of
the party countries or levels and their chosen ways of economic and social
development;
(ii) restrictions representing an attempt to infringe the national sovereignty of
partner countries or a threat to their political or economic independence, in-
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ist nations was presented in the guise of support for Group of 77
positions, and Soviet substance was masked by Soviet form.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps the greatest problem facing international lawyers to-
day is the difficulty in using law to resolve problems that are fun-
damentally political and based on uneven distribution of power.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the attempt to create a New
International Economic Order, particularly as it relates to the
transfer of technology. The Group of 77 appears to believe that the
negotiations on the proposed Code of Conduct on Transfer of
Technology will successfully lead to an internationally binding in-
strument that will resolve the current imbalance in technology
transfer negotiating strength. Unfortunately, the same imbalance
also marks the negotiations on the Code.
It is true that a coalition comprised of the Group of 77 and
Group D could create a majority with the capability of using the
negotiations to make law, or, more accurately, to influence strongly
the making of law.126 At times the negotiating process has revealed
the appearance of such an alliance. As seen above, however, this
appearance is, in fact, illusion. Group D members have their own
interests regarding technology transfers, whether as suppliers or
recipients, and the Group's role in the negotiations is shaped by
these interests rather than the interests of the developing nations.
Thus, rhetoric aside, the Third World is, with regard to the most
important outstanding issues, faced with a Group B and Group D
united front.
On the crucial issue of the legal character of the Code, it seems
cluding their implementation of plans and their achievement of developing goals;
(iii) restrictions hindering the restructuring of international economic relations
on a just and equitable basis;
(iv) restrictions hampering the development and strengthening of the national
technological capacity of technology-receiving countries, especially developing
countries, or impeding the desire of technology suppliers to contribute towards
the strengthening of that capacity;
(v) restrictions aimed at creating and preserving technological dependence of
technology-receiving countries, especially developing countries, or imposing
upon them a technology which does not conform to their social and economic
conditions and development objectives.
Group D 1977 Draft, supra note 76, at 8 (emphasis added).
126. See Hazard, supra note 104, at 11.
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highly likely that the Group of 77 will not attain its goal of an
internationally binding instrument. Without the force of binding
law the Code will have a diminished impact and will not lead to
meaningful restructuring of the international economy. Neverthe-
less, even non-binding international law can be of some utility,
127
and likely these negotiations, and the Code that they will produce,
will have some positive effect on future technology transfer ar-
rangements. Some of the evils of the present system will be re-
dressed, but the fundamental inequality of power will not be cor-
rected, and the New International Economic Order will not be
established as a result of this Code. Dramatic progress, desperately
though it may be needed, will not occur until the international eco-
nomic crisis becomes so bad that the member nations of all major
negotiating blocs come to realize that it is in their collective en-
lightened self-interest1 28 to bring about radical change.
127. On the value of non-binding international law, see generally Dupuy, Declaratory
Law and Programmatory Law: From Revolutionary Custom to "Soft Law," in DECLARA-
TIONS OF PRINCIPLES: A QUEST FOR PACE 247 (R. AKKERMAN, P. VAN KRIEKEN & C. PAN-
NEBORG, eds. 1977); Editorial Comment-The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding Interna-
tional Agreements, supra note 118, at 296. The Soviets apparently see some value in
customary rules of conduct which have not yet achieved the status of customary norms of
international law. See, e.g., Tunkin, Remarks on the Juridical Nature of Customary Norms
of International Law, supra note 112, at 419-23.
128. For a discussion of "mutual interest" in structural change of the global economy,
see Brandt Commission, supra note 3, at 7-47.
[Vol. 30778
